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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER REGARDING 
RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANCE ABUSE SHOULD BE IGNORED BY 
THIS COURT. 
Petitioner spends a significant amount of time in Petitioner's opposition brief 
discussing Respondent's substance abuse. Respondent's substance abuse is irrelevant to 
the issues present on appeal. One such statement even lacks citation to the record. 
Specifically, Petitioner's statement that "Respondent came to court high on drugs and 
reeking of alcohol" lacks any citation to the record. Petitioner's Brief at pg. 43. Clearly 
the marriage was damaged. Clearly it is appropriate that the parties are now divorced. 
However, Respondent's substance abuse does not have any bearing on the issues 
presented here on appeal. Respondent is arguing that the trial court failed to properly 
categorize the real property at issue as marital, and as a result, failed to divide it correctly. 
Petitioner does not appear to provide any legal basis regarding the relevance of these 
statements, other than how they may have impacted Respondent's credibility at the trial. 
As such, this Court should ignore the statements made in Petitioner's brief regarding 
Respondent's substance abuse to the extent that they fail to directly address the issues 
present on appeal. 
II. RESPONDENT HAS ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE ON 
APPEAL REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT ALL 
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS WERE MADE FROM PETITIONER'S SEPARATE 
FUNDS. 
Petitioner argues that Respondent has failed to adequately marshal the evidence on 
appeal regarding the trial court's finding that all payments of the mortgage principal and 
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interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. See Petitioner's Brief at 13 and 
R. at 705 and 727. Petitioner gives several examples of evidence that should have 
purportedly been marshaled. However, the evidence Petitioner points to is irrelevant. 
Rather than examine each piece of evidence discussed by Petitioner, the 
undisputed evidence should be considered. It is not disputed that Petitioner made the 
mortgage payments from her individual account. Tr. at 153: 11-25 and 154: 1-10. Nor is 
it disputed that this is the same account that Respondent's personal injury settlement 
funds were ultimately deposited. Tr. at 153: 23-25 and 154: 1-7, Exhibit 16 and 
Petitioner's Brief at 25. The allegedly omitted, relevant evidence that Petitioner points to 
does nothing to controvert the undisputed fact that Respondent's personal injury 
settlement was deposited in the same account from which monthly mortgage payments 
were made. For example, when Petitioner closed on the home, and when the parties 
became separated is irrelevant, and does nothing to further the discussion of whether or 
not the mortgage principal and interest was paid from Petitioner's separate funds. See 
Petitioner's Brief at 13. 
Therefore, this Court should find that Respondent has adequately marshaled the 
evidence. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID MISAPPLY THE LAW IN ITS FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY WAS 
PETITIONER'S SEPARATE PROPERTY AND THAT RESPONDENT WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE APPRECIATION OF SAID 
PROPERTY. 
Petitioner argues that the trial court correctly applied the law in making its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that the real property acquired during the marriage 
was Petitioner's separate property. Petitioner's argument is simply not supported by the 
undisputed evidence, and is contrary to law. A trial court's property division will be 
modified when "there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, 
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(titing English v. English, 
565 P.2d 409,410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)). Clearly that has occurred in this situation. 
The law regarding property division states, "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled 
to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Thomas 
v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); See also Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 
1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("once a court makes a finding that a specific item is 
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties"). 
Further, "[m]arital property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it 
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988)). A 
trial court should award separate property back to that spouse, including "appreciation or 
enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense 
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in i t . . . or (2) the property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made 
a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
308 (Utah 1988); See also Dunn 802 P.2d at 1321 ("[pjremarital property may lose its 
separate distinction where the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital 
estate, or where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital 
estate.") Any deviation from the rule that the marital estate be divided equally "is only 
justified when the trial court 'memorialize^] in commendably detailed findings' the 
exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT 
App. 373, f 27, 993 P.2d 887 (citing Thomas, 987 P.2d at 609). 
Petitioner states that Respondent cannot show that his personal injury funds were 
applied to the mortgage payments and principle. See Petitioner's Brief at 18. Even if 
Petitioner is correct, and the mortgage payments were not at all made from the 
contribution of Respondent's personal injury settlement, it is nonconsequential. 
Petitioner acknowledges that Respondent's separate funds were deposited into 
Petitioner's separate account. See Petitioner's Brief at 25 ("[t]he single deposit of Mr. 
Johnson's personal injury settlement funds into the separate account of Ms. Castillo on 
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September 11, 2004 is not disputed.") Nor is it disputed that mortgage payments came 
from that account. Tr. at 153: 11-25 and 154: 1-10. It is not disputed that after 
Respondent's personal injury funds were deposited into Petitioner's personal account, the 
landscaping was paid for from that account. Tr. at 167: 14-25; 168: 1-9 and Exhibit 15. 
At the close of proceedings, the trial court stated in regard to the $24,635.37 that 
constituted a portion of Respondent's personal injury settlement, "[i]t appears that the 
$24,000 or whatever that was put into her account was used in part for landscaping." Tr. 
at 209:8-9; See also, Petitioner's Brief at pg. 20, ("[a]n analysis of the separate bank 
account activity, Addenda 3 and 4, during September and October, 2004, in the light most 
favorable to the findings, shows that Mr. Johnson's personal injury settlement proceeds 
were applied towards payment of the amounts associated with the landscaping bid 
proposal") Landscaping is an important aspect of real property and contributed to the 
value of the real property at issue in this matter. Therefore, how Respondent's personal 
injury funds were spent is irrelevant. The decisive factor is whether or not those funds 
contributed to the value of the real property. See Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 ("the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, 
or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it.") Where the 
trial court made statements that at the very least Respondent's financial contributions 
should be attributed to landscaping, there has been "enhancement." Id. 
It is also unimportant that Respondent's financial contributions were smaller than 
Petitioner's. As was stated in Respondent's initial brief, factors in property division "do 
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not include a consideration of which partner was the more economically productive 
during the marriage." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1322. Any such analysis would be flawed 
because it "ignores contributions of love, encouragement, and companionship, which 
elude monetary valuation . . . [and] gives short shrift to spouses who contribute 
homemaking skills and child care." Id Initially, it should be noted that this was real 
property purchased after the marriage, and was the place where the parties raised their 
minor child. R. at 48 121(a) and 56 ^ 1; R. at 2 and 35 & Tr. at 14-20. Further, 
Newmever v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987), which was not dealt with directly 
by Petitioner, should be considered. In that case there was a marked disparity in the 
financial contributions of the parties. Id. at 1277-1278. The trial court determined that 
the plaintiff was entitled to the amounts she had contributed towards the homes, but that 
the equity was marital property and should be divided equally. IcL at 1277. The Utah 
Supreme Court determined that the trial court had acted appropriately when it awarded 
Jeddy Newmeyer "an equal share in the appreciation of the value of the homes despite his 
much lower contribution," despite the differentiation in financial contribution. Id. at 
1278. Respondent should not be penalized because of his smaller financial contribution. 
However, the amount Respondent contributed, roughly $24,000.00, is significant under 
any standard. 
In this case, the real property should have then been categorized as marital. See 
Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022. At that point, the appreciation to the real property should have 
been divided equally, after encumbrances for the property were paid, expenses for the 
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sale were paid, and each party was given back what financial contributions had been 
made. See Newmever, 745 P.2d at 1278; Thomas, 987 P.2d at 610. Clearly there has 
been a "misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error," with "the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings," and a 
"serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Naranjo, 751 
P.2d at 1146 (citing English, 565 P.2d at 410; Eames, 735 P.2d at 397.) The trial court's 
determination should be reversed. 
IV. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT EXIST THAT WOULD 
JUSTIFY AN UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY. 
In Utah, "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate 
property and fifty percent of the marital property." Thomas, 987 P.2d at 610. Further, 
an unequal distribution of marital property by a trial court "is only justified when the trial 
court 'memorialize^] in commendably detailed findings' the exceptional circumstances 
supporting the distribution." Bradford, 1999 UT App. at f27; (citing Thomas, 987 P.2d 
at 609.) This Court should ignore Petitioner's arguments regarding special 
circumstances. 
Petitioner argues that Respondent failed to show any special circumstances at trial 
that would justify giving him any of Petitioner's separate property. Respondent's Brief at 
23. Petitioner misses the point of Respondent's argument. Respondent argues that the 
real property's appreciation is marital property and therefore should be divided equally. 
Thomas, 987 P.2d at 610. Then, if the marital property is not divided equally the trial 
court must find special circumstances to warrant the unequal distribution. Bradford, 1999 
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UT App. at Tf 27. Respondent need not show exceptional circumstances, as Petitioner 
argues, because he did not ask for more than half of the marital property. 
Petitioner argued that her special circumstances are a need for future surgeries. 
Petitioner's Brief at 44. However, Petitioner failed to present evidence regarding the cost 
of future surgeries and whether Petitioner's trust, which was designed to cover such 
surgeries, would be insufficient without an unequal distribution of the appreciation of the 
marital home. Nor did the trial court make adequate findings in this regard. 
Therefore, this Court should hold that the trial court failed to properly categorize 
the property and failed to memorialize in detail findings Petitioner's special 
circumstances to warrant an unequal distribution of the marital property. 
V. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT REIMBURSEMENT FOR 
MEDICAL EXPENSES SHOULD BE REMANDED TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER THE PAYMENT WAS MADE BEFORE OR DURING THE 
MARRIAGE. 
The trial court reimbursed Petitioner $10,000.00 for a surgery that she paid for 
regarding Respondent's back. R. at 705 and 727-728. Respondent argues that the trial 
court did not have sufficient facts to determine that the payment was subject to 
reimbursement because the date of the surgery was not determined, therefore requiring a 
remand. Respondent's Brief at 36-38, Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1148. Petitioner responds to 
this argument by stating that the trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility 
of the witness and their testimony. Petitioner's Brief at 46. Credibility of the witness has 
nothing to do with the determination at issue here. Clearly from the transcript, neither 
party could recall the date which is essential for that determination. Tr. 153: 1-6. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has stated "[b]ecause of the personal nature of special 
damages, amounts received as compensation for pain, suffering, disfigurement, disability, 
or other personal debilitation are generally found to be the personal property of the 
injured spouse in divorce actions." Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1148. Further, "money realized 
as compensation for lost wages and medical expenses, which diminish the marital estate, 
are considered to be marital property." Id. Petitioner argues that the burden switches to 
the Respondent to persuade the trial court regarding the disposition of his personal injury. 
Petitioner's Brief at 46. However, Petitioner fails to cite to any authority for this legal 
conclusion. Moreover, it was Petitioner who was asking the trial court to award her 
money from Respondent's potentially separate funds. 
Therefore, this Court should hold that the issue of reimbursement for medical 
expenses should be remanded to determine whether the payment was made before or 
during the marriage. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court be 
reversed, or in the alternative that the case be remanded so that adequate findings can be 
made in regard to the cost of future surgeries for Petitioner, whether Petitioner can pay 
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for those surgeries from her personal injury settlement, and/or the exact date of 
Respondent's surgery and when that surgery was paid for. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June 2007. 
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
iMUEL/M. BARKER 
LDL^X J. SCHOFIELD 
TREY A. CALLISTER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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